Digital currency is designed to compete with central bank …at money and the banking system but may create new …nancial stability risk. Central banks are considering issuing their own …at public digital currency in response. This paper shows that privately issued digital currency, such as bitcoin, may be adopted in reaction to distortionary central bank in ‡ation on …at money. Banks that take private digital currency deposits can emerge to provide e¢ cient liquidity risk sharing without the in ‡ationary risk of …at money. Rather than displacing banks, private and public digital currency threaten a new form of banking crises caused by disintermediation runs through withdrawals of digital currency. A central bank can act as lender of last resort to prevent the threat of such digital currency runs for banks with public but not private digital currency deposits. There is a trade-o¤ for private digital currency that avoids the costs of central bank in ‡ation but is subject to fragility through digital currency runs.
Introduction
The rapid development of digital currency has prompted widely acclaimed interest in its potential impact on the …nancial system and the economy. A primary motivation behind the development of digital currency, such as the advent of bitcoin by Nakamoto (2008) , is that it has a …xed supply rather than the discretionary supply of central bank …at money. A second key motivation is that digital currency allows for payments without need for banks. Questions have emerged about whether digital currency might eventually displace …at money and the banking system. In response, central banks worldwide are considering, and some have begun, issuing their own form of digital currency.
1 Concerns have also arisen about whether digital currency might create fragility in the …nancial system.
2
This paper develops a model of digital currency introduced into an economy with banks and a central bank. Privately issued digital currency, such as bitcoin, may be adopted if the central bank creates distortionary in ‡ation on …at money, regardless of whether the central bank tries to compete with its own publicly issued digital currency. While digital currency can replace banks for providing a payments, banks that take digital currency deposits can emerge to provide e¢ cient liquidity risk sharing without the in ‡ationary risk of …at money. Rather than displacing banks, digital currency threatens a new form of banking crises caused by digital currency runs on banks that take digital currency deposits. A central bank can act as lender of last resort to prevent the threat of such withdrawal runs for banks taking publicly issued but not privately digital currency deposits.
An economy with a monetary system that is based on a private digital currency instead of central bank …at money is a viable possibility, as suggested by Raskin and Yermack (2016) . Bitcoin has had increasing adoption in several countries with high in ‡ation problems including Venezuela, Iran, Argentina, Ukraine, Zimbabwe, and other African countries.
3 Raskin and Yermack (2016) also point out widespread expectations that digital 1 See Bech and Rodney (2017) , Bordo and Levin (2017) , Broadbent (2016) , Cawrey (2014) , Jack and Suri (2011), Popper (2015) , and Rosenfeld (2015) .
2 For example, see Winkler (2015) and Nelson (2017) . 3 For example, see Raskin, Max (2012) and Urban (2017) . currency will disintermediate banks by ending fractional reserve banking. 4 The establishment of either a public or private digital currency in an economy could allow for holding money and an e¢ cient digital means of payment without use of the banking system.
However, fractional reserve banking based on paying a return on deposits and making loans denominated in bitcoin is emerging. Mastercard has recently won patents, and is applying for additional ones, for methods and systems for a fractional reserve digital currency bank. 5 Several platforms already provide bitcoin savings accounts that pay interest generated by returns from lending bitcoin for leveraged trading. 6 In addition, empirical evidence demonstrates that despite the ability for the growing …ntech economy to operate outside of …nancial intermediation, banking in e¤ect reemerges. 7 While bitcoin-based banks are showing signs of an initial emergence, broad concerns that private digital currency might create systemic …nancial fragility
have as yet to be formalized and studied. 8 In my model, two forms of digital currency are introduced into an economy based on banking with …at money. Digital currency that is issued by the central bank, referred to as public digital currency, is …at money that can be held by consumers in direct accounts at the central bank and hence outside of the banking system.
9
Digital currency such as bitcoin that is privately issued, referred to as private digital currency, can also be held as a form of outside money directly by consumers. Both forms of digital currency can be used by consumers to make payments for buying and selling goods without relying on holding bank deposits to make payments for such transactions. 4 For example, see Vigna and Casey (2015) . 5 See Madore (2018) , Suberg (2018) , and U.S. Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (2018) . 6 See See Kharif (2019) , Lielacher (2017) , Tomasicchio (2016) , Cruz (2015) , Johnson (2015) , and for a list of such platforms, https://cryptalker.com/bitcoin-interest and https://cryptalker.com/bitcoin-savings.
7 Balyuk and Davydenko (2018) show that …ntech platforms designed for direct peer-to-peer lending are evolving toward becoming essentially online intermediaries in the form of banks that take investment from passive lenders and make active investment decisions for lending to borrowers. 8 In blog posts, Posner (2015a,b) is one of the few to point out that if bitcoin becomes widely adopted, fractional reserve banking denominated in bitcoin will be a natural outcome because of the value that banks provide, but that …nancial crises in a bitcoin-based banking system will also occur.
9 Raskin and Yermack (2016) describe how a central bank digital currency would enable households to hold such public digital currency directly in accounts at the central bank instead of in deposit accounts at commercial banks.
I show that if the central bank has a bias for short-term output, there is distortionary …at in ‡ation that can lead to privately issued digital currency being adopted and displacing …at money. Banks switch to taking private digital currency deposits to provide consumers with e¢ cient liquidity risk sharing without the in ‡ationary risk of …at money. The economy based on …at money can transition to a private digital currency while still featuring a fractional reserve banking system similar to that with …at money.
However, digital currency runs arise as a new threat on banks that take deposits in either privately or publicly issued digital currency. Such runs can disintermediate banks and cause their failure based on the ability of depositors to withdraw and hold digital currency as a store of value and means of payment outside of the banking system. The central bank can prevent the threat of these runs for banks with public digital currency deposits but not for banks with private digital currency deposits. The discretion that a central bank has over public digital currency, as with traditional …at reserves, allows for distortionary in ‡ation but also for acting as lender of last resort to prevent runs on banks with public digital currency deposits. There is a trade-o¤ for holding private digital currency. It avoids the costs of central bank in ‡ation borne by …at money but loses the liquidity value creation of bank deposits if held directly.
If instead, it is held as bank deposits, it is subject to fragility in the form of digital currency runs.
Indeed, the Federal Reserve was originally created for the primary purpose of being able to provide an "elastic supply of currency"in order to act as a lender of last resort.
But, the Fed's discretion to increase the money supply has often come under pressure since the founding of the Fed. The earliest call for a privately issued digital currency to constrain the elastic supply of …at money is likely by Milton Friedman. In 1999, Friedman famously foresaw and welcomed the opportunities for an internet-based digital currency to be supplied inelastically in an algorithmic manner according to an automated rule to constrain monetary policy discretion, as described by Raskin and Yermack (2016) .
Friedman's foresight re ‡ects two key features of private digital currency. First, it is supplied based on algorithmic quantities, whereas central banks have discretion over the supply of …at money. In my model, I assume that private digital currency is supplied with a …xed quantity. Whereas, the central bank does not have the ability to commit to a …xed supply of …at reserves or …at public digital currency.
Second, private digital currency utilizes a decentralized distributed ledger with blockchain technology and requires a protocol to achieve consensus for payments transactions in such a 'trustless' environment.
10 Public digital currency payments under current consideration would likely utilize a 'trusted' centralized central bank ledger. With developments in methods for private digital currency payments to support consensus for transactions in a more cost e¤ective manner, such as with proofof-stake rather than proof-of-work protocols, 11 or with second-layer protocols such as the Lightning Network to increase scalability, 12 private digital currency has the potential to be used as an e¢ cient means of digital payments similar to or even more advanced than electronic payments that are cleared and settled within the banking system. For this reason, I make the simplifying assumption in the paper of no transactions costs for payments in the economy and …nancial system made by using either digital currency as outside money or bank deposits as inside money.
13
The model provides several additional novel insights. I show the resiliency of the banking system based on an elastic price level that arises in a parsimonious model of the economy with …at money, which allows for a nominal unit of account, in contrast to models of real economies. As unit of account, …at money or private digital currency allows for elastic prices and a ‡exible real value of nominal bank deposits that provides 10 Kroll et al. (2013) examine bitcoin as a consensus game using costly computational mining as proof-of-work for transaction consensus, and which also requires a separate governing consensus for the rules of the bitcoin protocol. Biais et al. (2018a) show that bitcoin transaction consensus using the mining proof-of-work protocol is a Markov perfect equilibrium but that consensus over the protocol is a coordination game with multiple equilibria. examine methods for moderating the natural concentration of mining pools, and Easley et al. (2017) explain market-based transaction fees charged in addition to mining rewards.
11 Saleh (2018a,b) shows that protocols such as proof-of-stake or proof-of-burn can overcome the large computing resources costs required for proof-of-work consensus protocols, such as for bitcoin, which Parham (2017) demonstrates are prohibitive on a large scale.
12 Poon and Dryja (2016) describe how the Lightning Network, which has reached increasing success in recent small-value tests, acts as a decentralized network o¤ of the bitcoin blockchain for micropayments in bitcoin, with net payments then transacted on the bitcoin blockchain.
13 Payments Canada et al. (2018) demonstrate the potential for widespread banking payments without reliance on a central bank that would be required for banks to take private digital currency deposits. They describe the development and testing in Canada for e¢ ciently settling large-scale wholesale interbank payments with distributed ledger technology. A "notary node"consensus model shows promise for settlement …nality, which is required but not achieved with a proof-of-work protocol. Parlour et al. (2017) show that …ntech innovation in the bank payment system can reduce banks'need for intermediate liquidity in the interbank market, which results in an increase in bank lending and productive e¢ ciency. optimal risk sharing against asset and liquidity risk in a general equilibrium setting.
Even when banks are not required for an e¢ cient payment system, banking still occurs because of the bene…ts of maturity and risk transformation of illiquid assets for the e¢ cient provision of liquidity to the economy. Private digital currency can act as a form of outside money that banks hold in the form of private reserves, similar to the case of …at money as reserves, to enable standard fractional reserve banking.
Yet, while both public and private digital currency can have an elastic real value, a primary distinction between a private and public digital currency is that a central bank can provide an elastic supply of public digital currency, as with …at money, but not privately issued digital currency. Private digital currency does not act as a threat to merely discipline the central bank to lower …at in ‡ation, because the central bank faces a time-inconsistency problem. The central bank would not be credible if it tried to commit to lower in ‡ation. The central bank also cannot constrain itself from creating …at in ‡ation by issuing public digital currency. In contrast to in ‡ationary …at money, private digital currency requires a de ‡ationary price level to provide a return for holding it as a store of value.
Digital currency has been recently studied, along with blockchain technology utilized with distributed decentralized ledgers more broadly, in the rapidly growing …-nance and economics literature on …ntech.
14 Current papers on digital currency, banking, and central bank policy highlight several potential bene…ts and costs of private and public digital currency. These papers focus on private digital currency competing against monopolist central bank money, 15 public digital currency competing against bank deposits, 16 and competition among private digital currencies, 17 but 14 Raskin and Yermack (2016) highlight that debates over private digital currency as competition to …at money is demanding a resurgence in classical monetary economic theory based on von Mises (1912) , Hayek (1976) and Mundell (1998) . 15 Abadi and Brunnermeier (2018) show that because of free entry and distributed ledger fork competition, private digital currencies do not produce pro…ts for the issuer or miners but provide competition that only partially constrains central bank pro…ts arising through monopoly power as a centralized intermediary of …at money and payments. Schilling and Uhlig (2018) show that for a central bank with commitment to maintain the real value of …at money, there is exchange-rate indeterminacy for the price of private digital currency.
16 Andolfatto (2018) …nds that interest-bearing central bank digital currency constrains the pro…t but does not disintermediate monopolistic banks and may even lead to their expansion by providing competition for banks to increase deposit rates. In contrast, Keister and Sanches (2018) …nd that central bank digital currency increases exchange e¢ ciency in a search economy but crowds out investment by banks that rely on real deposits.
17 Fernandez-Villaverde and Sanches (2017a,b) …nd that competition among private digital curren-they do not examine …nancial stability concerns. Bolt and van Oordt (2016) show how the price volatility of private digital currency is driven by speculators but decreases as it becomes more widely adopted by consumers and accepted by merchants. explain the volatility of private digital currency based on the feedbackloop dynamics of it being adopted for transactions. Li and Mann (2018) point to initial coin o¤erings (ICOs) for investment in private digital currency platforms that can solve the adoption coordination problem. Sockin and Xiong (2018) show that the price and volume of private digital currency transactions act as coordination devices that determine whether there is high, low, or no transactions with the digital currency. Kim (2015) uses empirical evidence based on pre-blockchain based virtual currencies to argue that bitcoin volatility driven by speculators will signi…cantly decrease over time.
19 Biais et al. (2018b) provide an OLG model and empirical evidence that costly mining determines bitcoin's fundamental value based on the net present value of transactional bene…ts but also drives large volatility. Pagnotta and Buraschi (2018) show that mining costs being paid in bitcoin ampli…es the impact of supply and demand shocks on its price volatility.
20 See Jawaheri et al. (2018) , Meiklejohn (2016) , and Bohannon (2016) . 21 See Tasca et al. (2018) . 22 See Hosain (2018) .
and ubiquitous in the …nancial system and economy that digital currency may be a required complementary feature.
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The paper proceeds with the general model of the economy with banking, …at money, and digital currency introduced in Section 2. Section 3 presents the baseline equilibrium with …at reserves, followed by the analysis of public and private digital currency in section 4. Digital currency runs are studied in section 5, and section 6 provides concluding remarks. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
Model
The model builds on the theory of nominal bank contracts as developed in Allen and Skeie (2018), Allen et al. (2014 ), and Skeie (2004 . They show how nominal bank contracts with …at central bank money, and without consideration of a short-term central bank bias, can provide depositors with optimal consumption and …nancial stability against liquidity and asset risk. 24 The model also builds on the provision of liquidity provided by banks that enable runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) 25 and relates to the theory of banking liquidity and fragility in the context of interbank lending; 26 the role of lending money between banks, central bank lending and injections of money, and demand deposits paid in money in models of real bank de- 23 Applications of blockchain include more e¢ cient smart …nancial contracting , managing trading transparency in …nancial markets to increase investor welfare (Malinova and Park, 2017) , and the market for, and regulation of, …nancial reporting and auditing (Cao et al., 2018) . 24 Conditions for bank runs and contagion with nominal bank contracts are shown by Skeie (2004) as arising from interbank market liquidity freezes, and by Diamond and Rajan (2006) and Champ et al. (1996) as arising to due to withdrawals of currency out of the banking system based on consumer purchases of goods that must be made with traditional paper currency. Diamond and Rajan (2006) further show that nominal contracts do not protect from bank runs caused by heterogeneous shocks in asset returns. 25 Bank liquidity creation and fragility is further developed based on the insensitivity to information of deposits (Gorton and Pennachi, 1990, and Dang et al., 2013) , contracts relative to markets (Allen and Gale, 2004) , global games informational structures (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005) , central bank interest rate policy (Freixas et al., 2011) , e¢ cient risk management (DeAngelo and Stulz, 2015) , bailout policy (Shapiro and Skeie, 2015) , and central bank balance sheet policy (Martin et al., 2016 (Martin et al., , 2018 . Dynamic models of bank runs include Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016) , Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) , Martin et al. (2014a Martin et al. ( , 2014b , Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) , and He and Xiong (2012) . 26 Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) , Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994) , Allen and Gale (2000a) , Diamond and Rajan (2005) , Acharya and Ashcraft et al. (2011 Within date ; …rms store an amount of goods g t; at period t 2 f0; 1g for safe, short-term liquidity for a return of one at t + 1. However, goods cannot be stored between dates; i.e., goods cannot be stored at period t = 2. Firms invest an amount of goods a 0; at period t = 0 in the form of risky, long-term illiquid assets. An amount a 1; a 0; of these assets are liquidated at t = 1 for a salvage return of r 1 2 (0; 1) at t = 1, where r 1 is a constant. The remaining assets a 0; a 1; that are not liquidated have a random return r 2; 2 (r 1 ; r max 2 ) at t = 2 with expected return E[r 2; ] = r 2 > 1:
At each date ; a random fraction 2 (0; 1) of consumers have a privately 
The new generation of consumers at each date has a mass size n , with n = r 2 , 27 Allen and Gale (1998), Gale and Vives (2002) , Freixas et al. (2000 Freixas et al. ( , 2003 , Freixas and Holthausen (2001) , Rochet and Vives (2004) , and Chang and Velasco (2000) . 28 Holmström and Tirole (1998) and Diamond and Rajan (2005) . 29 Rochet and Tirole (1996) and Aghion et al. (2000) . 30 Fur…ne (1999) , Henckel (1999) , Flannery (1996) and Hancock and Wilcox (1996) .
which implies that the aggregate mass of endowment goods at period t = 0 of date is n e 0; = n = r 2 : The aggregate state ( ,r 2; ) is realized and observable but not veri…able at t = 1 of date :
Fiat money and digital currency
Fiat reserves At period t = 0 of date = 0; the central bank issues to banks M 0 of …at reserves, which is …at outside money that only banks can hold in accounts at the central bank.
Digital currency There are two forms of digital currency considered. The …rst type is public digital currency issued by the central bank. Public digital currency is …at outside money and is equivalent to …at reserves with the exception that it can also be held by consumers and …rms in the form of accounts at the central bank and outside of the banking system. Public digital currency held by banks is equivalent to …at reserves.
The second type of digital currency is private digital currency issued by a private issuer, such as bitcoin. Consumers and …rms can hold private digital currency outside of the banking system, while banks can also hold private digital currency as a form of private reserves.
Speci…cally, at date 0 > 0; an amount M 0 indexed by 2 fv; sg of digital currency is received by the new generation of consumers at period t = 0 as outside money, where M v is private digital currency (e.g., bitcoin), and M s is public (sovereign) central bank digital currency (aka, CBDC).
Fiat reserves and digital currency can be stored across periods and dates, and Goods market and nominal prices There is a goods market at each period t 2 f0; 1; 2g with …at money as numeraire at all dates ; and also for private digital currency as numeraire at dates 0 : The goods market price is P t; ; where 2 fv; sg is the numeraire. Hence, prices P s t; refer to the amount of …at money, which for dates 0 includes public digital currency, per unit of goods. For dates 0 ; prices P v t;
refer to the amount of private digital currency per unit of goods. For dates < 0 ,
is the exchange rate between digital currency 2 fv; sg and …at money at period t of date 0 . Hence, X v t; is the quantity of …at money per unit of private digital currency, and X s t; = 1. For convenience of language, 'rate'is used interchangeably with 'return' in all contexts to refer to gross rate of return rather than net rate of return throughout the paper.
Banks and …rms In order to simplify the presentation, the analysis throughout the paper including quantities is presented on a normalized per capita basis. Banks take deposits D 0; from consumers and lend L F 0; to …rms, where 2 fv; sg indicates that deposits and loans can be denominated in either …at money or, for dates 0 ;
private digital currency. Firms use loans to buy goods from consumers, and …rms choose the allocation of goods to store and to invest in assets. At period t = 1;
…rms rollover an amount of borrowing L R k t; is the return paid at t 2 f1; 2g on the type of deposit or loan k 2 K fD; F; CBg; which correspond to deposits, loans to …rms, and bank borrowing from the central bank, respectively. The value
1 is the fraction of the quantity actually repaid at t 2 f1; 2g of the deposit or loan type k 2 K: For example, deposits pay a total return of D t; D 0; R D t; when withdrawn at t 2 f1; 2g: If k t; < 1; the borrowing agent defaults at period t of date ; which requires the borrowing agent to pay all revenues possible to maximize k t; :
31 If a bank takes a deposit in public or private digital currency, it must repay that digital currency in kind when withdrawn 31 For simplicity, I assume that in case of a bank default D t; < 1 at period t 2 f1; 2g; there is a pro rata sharing rule among deposits withdrawn at that period. Results do not change if there were instead any type of priority rule, such as with a sequential service constraint for deposit withdrawals at t = 1 in which some deposit withdrawals have no default, D 1; = 1; and the remaining deposit withdrawals have a complete default, D 1; = 0: A bank default on withdrawals at t = 1; D 1; < 1; requires the bank to pay all of its revenues at t = 1 for withdrawals. This implies that the bank cannot rollover any lending to its …rms, L F 1; = 0. Hence, the bank will not have any revenues at t = 2; has a complete default at t = 2; D 2; = 0; and cannot borrow from the central bank, L CB 1; = 0: Such a bank is referred to as liquidated at t = 1; since it has no loan assets after t = 1: Since the bank's …rms cannot rollover any of their loans, these …rms will also default at t = 1; and R CB 2; on t = 1 loans, and quantities and prices at t 2 f1; 2g; are contingent on the aggregate state. For simplicity of notation, the state ( ; r 2 ; ) is suppressed in the writing of these dependent variables except where it is included for particular emphasis. In addition, the subscript for the generic date is omitted, except where it is included to refer to a particular non-generic date or to provide extra clarity when comparing a variable across di¤erent dates.
Outside money The model is developed to allow for a parsimonious representation of outside money, whether in the form of traditional …at reserves, public digital currency, or private digital currency. The distinction of the regime with …at reserves, before digital currency is introduced at date 0 ; is that there is not a form of outside money held by consumers or …rms, such as in the form of paper currency outside of the banking system. This is motivated by the fact that it is much too costly for paper currency to be stored, secured, and transacted in markets on the large scale that is transacted in the economy through electronic bank payments. When digital currency is introduced starting date 0 ; the ability for consumers to use it for e¢ cient payment transactions outside of the banking system is a key distinguishing feature of digital currency in the model.
Optimizations
The model is …rst presented with the assumption that there are no early deposit withdrawals at t = 1 by late consumers in order to examine the e¤ects of …at money and digital currency without the potential threat of bank runs. In section 5, this assumption is relaxed to study digital currency runs.
Consumers At period t = 0 of date ; the representative consumer's budget constraint is Consumption for early and late consumers from goods bought with deposit withdrawals and digital currency can be expressed as:
early consumer at t = 1:
where
is the amount of digital currency stored from t = 1 to t = 2 by late consumer i 2 I:
Consumers have expected utility
and have the following optimization:
. The …rst inequality is the consumer's budget constraint at t = 0; and the last two inequalities are feasibility constraints.
Banks Because of free entry, the representative bank maximizes its depositors expected utility from the consumption that the bank's deposits provide at each date , which is
The bank's optimization is:
t=0:
2 ) 0 and ; at t = 2 of date and maximizes pro…t in the form of expected consumption as follows:
s.t.:
0, where q t is the quantity of goods bought (at period t = 0) and sold (at periods t 2 f1; 2g) in the goods market for …at money (including public digital currency at 0 ) for = s and for private digital currency at 0 for = v; and where
; fq t ; M F t g t2f0;1;2g g ;r 2 ; ; :
The …rst three inequalities are the …rm's budget constraints, the latter four inequalities are feasibility constraints, and all constraints must hold for all dates :
Central bank The central bank's utility is that of the expected utility of consumers, except with the discount factor CB 1 on period t = 2 consumption, which is expressed as
If CB < 1; the central bank has a short-term bias with more concern about consumption, and hence output in the economy, at period t = 1 over that at period t = 2:
The central bank can directly choose the nominal interest rate R (e) …at money at t 2 f0; 1; 2g:
); and (f) goods at t 2 f0; 1; 2g:
3 Fiat money I initially analyze the baseline economy with only …at money in the form of reserves to
show the potential impact of distortionary …at in ‡ation, which provides the rationale for the introduction of digital currency in the next section. To provide a benchmark for the subsequent market equilibrium analysis, I …rst present the full-information, …rst best allocation.
First best
The planner's optimization is to maximize consumer's expected utility as follows:
The …rst-order conditions and binding constraints for the planner's optimization give optimal consumption according to
The …rst line above gives the Euler equation showing that in expectation, the ratio of marginal utilities between t = 1 and t = 2 is equal to the marginal rate of transformation r 2 :
Optimal liquidity risk-sharing between early and late consumers decreases consumption risk, with expected consumption
. This is implemented with an optimal quantity of t = 0 storage, g 0 ; that is greater than the endowment of the expected fraction of early consumers, :
The optimal consumption for early and late consumers, c 1 and c 2 ; depend on the optimal amount of goods (g 1 ) stored from t = 1 to t = 2 and the optimal asset liquidation (a 1 ) at t = 1; which both depend upon the realization of the aggregate state ( ; r 2 ). The following proposition shows that g 1 > 0 when and r 2 are relatively low, written as < (r 2 ); and a 1 > 0 when and r 2 are relatively high, written as >^ (r 2 ).
Proposition 1
The optimal amount of storage at t = 1 is positive, g 1 > 0, when there are relatively few early consumers and low asset returns. Conversely, the optimal amount of asset liquidation at t = 1 is positive, a 1 > 0; when there are relatively many early consumers and high asset returns.
A comparison of optimal consumption for early and late consumers is illustrated in the two diagrams in Figure 1 . As r 2 increases for a constant realization of , and as increases for a constant realization of r 2 , there is initially a decreasing amount of positive storage at t = 1 to provide equal consumption c 2 = c 1 ; then no t = 1 storage or liquidation, and …nally an increasing amount of t = 1 liquidation to provide a partial transfer of late consumers'increasing consumption to early consumers.
Fiat reserves equilibrium
At each date < 0 ; banks hold …at reserves and lend L 
The price levels re ‡ect the amount of money supplied by consumers for purchasing goods divided by the amount of goods sold by …rms within each period.
In ‡ation Within date ; in ‡ation between periods is de…ned as follows:
in ‡ation between periods t = 0 and t = 1 s 2; ( ; r 2 )
in ‡ation between periods t = 1 and t = 2:
Fiat money with …rst best allocation First consider the case of CB = 1, in which the central bank does not have a short-term bias.
Proposition 2 If the central bank does not have short-term bias, CB = 1; the market equilibrium provides the optimal …rst best consumption c 1 and c 2 with no bank defaults, D t = 1, for all realizations of ( ; r 2 ).
Since deposits pay out nominal amounts, the bank can pay …xed promises in terms of money as numeraire with no bank defaults, ; respectively.
Optimal consumption The …rst key result for the market to provide optimal consumption is that at t = 0; …rms store the optimal amount of real liquidity, g 0 = g 0 :
The optimal storage follows from the Euler equation from the bank optimization of its depositors'expected utility for the provision of optimal liquidity for early consumers,
; which is equivalent to Euler equation for the planner's optimization. At t = 0; the expected real return on bank loans to …rms at t = 1 is equal to the expected return on assets, E[
which is greater than the implicit expected real return paid on deposit withdrawals at t = 2 relative to t = 1:
The second key result is that the market provides the optimal rationing of goods between early and late consumers through the optimal quantity of goods sold by …rms,
; due to the price mechanism. The real rate on loans to …rms between periods t = 1 and t = 2 is r ; which is the marginal rate of transformation for the illiquid asset not being liquidated (r 2 ) relative to being liquidated (r 1 ); and hence there is no storage at t = 1, g 1 = 0:
As a result, if there is a moderate real rate r In particular, for a moderate realization of ( ; r 2 ) given by 2 [ (r 2 );^ (r 2 )], the equilibrium price levels at t = 1 and t = 2 are moderate, with P ; and the real rate is the optimal r ]. Firms sell at t = 1 all of their goods stored from t = 0 and sell at t = 2 the returns on all their assets. For a low realization of ( ; r 2 ) given by < (r 2 ); there is downward pressure on P s 1 and upward pressure on P s 2 ; with optimal real rate r F s 2 = 1: With fewer early consumers, the amount of inside money spent for goods is reduced at t = 1 and increased at t = 2: With lower returns, fewer goods produced by assets are available to sell at t = 2: Firms respond to these market prices by storing the optimal amount g 1 of their goods at t = 1 to sell at t = 2; which provides for equal consumption among early consumers withdrawing at t = 1 and late depositors withdrawing at t = 2: Conversely, for a high realization of ( ; r 2 ) given by >^ (r 2 ); there is relative upward pressure on P s 1 and downward pressure on P s 2 ; with optimal real rate r ; where
Firms respond by liquidating the optimal amount a 1 of their assets to sell additional goods at t = 1. For all realizations of ( ; r 2 ), …rms have zero consumption: c Central bank …at in ‡ation Central bank discretion over the supply of …at money presents the potential of distortionary in ‡ation if the central bank has a bias for higher short-term consumption and output that arises from a lower discount factor CB < 1 than consumers'discount factor at period t = 2; which has been implicitly set equal to one. The central bank short-term bias can take two di¤erent forms, which are analyzed in turn. One form is that the central bank's bias comes as a surprise to the public at period t = 1; after asset investment decisions are made at period t = 0: The second form is that the central bank's bias is known by the public at period t = 0:
For the …rst form of bias, the public expects at t = 0 that the central bank has a discount factor CB = 1 and will set its policy rate at R CB ; and …rms choose a 0 as their asset investment. At t = 1; the central bank unexpectedly sets a higher nominal rateR CB > R CB 2 to maximize consumers' expected utility with the lower discount factor B CB < 1; with a real central bank rate of r
implies that …rms excessively liquidate assets at t = 1;
For the second form of central bank bias, the public knows the central bank's discount factor CB < 1: Rather than a greater amount of output at t = 1 through excessive asset liquidation at t = 1; …rms in anticipation instead store excessive goods and hold lower investment at t = 0 than the …rst best:â 0 < a 0 :
Proposition 3 For either an unexpected or expected central bank short-term bias of CB < 1, there is distortionary in ‡ation at t = 2 of^ I proceed by assuming that the central bank's discount factor CB 1 is known by the public at t = 0; such that distortionary …at in ‡ation is fully anticipated when the central bank has a short-term bias with CB < 1:
Digital currency
In this section, I …rst analyze the equilibrium with only a public digital currency to establish its equivalence to …at reserves. Then, private digital is included along with public digital currency.
Public digital currency
At period t = 0 of date 0 ; consumers receive M s public digital currency in addition to e 0 P s 0; revenues from selling their endowment goods. From these proceeds, consumers allocate the amount of money to store as digital currency, M If the central bank has a short-term bias, the impact of distortionary …at in ‡ation between periods t = 1 and t = 2 occurs through lower than optimal prices at t = 1; P s 1 < P s 1 ; and higher than optimal prices at t = 2;P s 2 > P s 2 ; which results from the distortionary in ‡ation^ s 2 > s 2 : This distortionary in ‡ation impacts the periods t = 1 and t = 2 real value of public digital currency stored by consumers at t = 0 and deposits made at t = 0 in an equivalent manner. Hence, regardless of whether or not the central bank has a short-term bias, consumers prefer to deposit their entire proceeds at period t = 0 and not hold public digital currency since deposits pay the nominal return R Ds t ; which is greater than the return of one on storing public digital currency.
Lemma 1 With public digital currency, consumers continue to hold bank deposits rather than hold public digital currency directly. However, this in ‡ation is not distortionary because the relative price level between periods t = 1 and t = 2 of date 0 and future dates, which is the in ‡ation rate
E¤ect of public digital currency on in ‡ation
for periods t 2 f1; 2g at all dates 0 ; is not e¤ected.
Lemma 2 Public digital currency creates a one-time in ‡ation through a higher general price level at date 0 that is not distortionary.
Public digital currency held by consumers as bank deposits is equivalent to …at money deposits, which provide liquidity risk sharing but bear the cost of distortionary in ‡a-tion when the central bank has a short-term bias, CB < 1:
Since public digital currency is deposited at banks, it ends up being held as an increase of overall …at money reserves in the banking system. At period t = 0 of date 0 ; after loans L 
Private digital currency
Now consider private as well as public digital currency introduced at date 0 . and t = 2; …rms sell to consumers a portion of their output goods for …at money to repay bank loans and remaining output goods for private digital currency, which …rms hold into future dates. At these dates > 0 ; …rms use a combination of their holdings of private digital currency along with …at money loans from banks to buy endowment goods from consumers at period t = 0. At periods t = 1 and t = 2; …rms again sell output goods for …at money to repay loans and for private digital currency to retain.
Private digital currency without deposits
The real return in terms of consumption from holding private digital currency
for early consumers and maxf 
Private digital currency with bank deposits
Next, I examine the economy without the assumption that private digital currency is held outside of the banking system. In addition to …at and public digital currency deposits, banks can take deposits and make loans that are denominated in private digital currency.
At period t = 0 of date 0 ; consumers have the additional option of making deposits Proposition 5 With private digital currency, consumers hold bank deposits denominated in private digital currency rather than holding private digital currency directly.
Banks operate by holding private digital currency as a form of private reserves in a similar manner as holding public digital currency as …at reserves.
Corollary 3 Banks are not displaced by private or public digital currency.
Private digital currency versus …at money
If the central bank does not have a short-term bias, with CB = 1; consumers are indi¤erent between holding bank deposits denominated in private digital currency or …at money. However, if the central bank does have a short-term bias, with CB < 1 that leads to distortionary …at in ‡ation, consumers prefer to hold only private digital currency deposits, which provide optimal consumption: c 1 = c 1 ; c i 2 = c 2 : Fiat money and public digital currency is not held and is driven out by private digital currency.
Proposition 6 Private digital currency drives out …at money and public digital currency if the central bank has a short-term bias that creates distortionary …at in ‡ation.
Digital runs
With private or public digital currency bank deposits, there is also a threat of digital currency runs that is now considered. The threat is that late consumers may withdraw early and store digital currency outside of the banking system at t = 1:
Excessive withdrawals of digital currency can deplete the banking system and cause bank defaults at t = 1; which require banks to liquidate by not rolling over loans to …rms. The analysis proceeds by analyzing the threat of runs, followed by the analysis of the central bank acting as lender of last resort.
Early withdrawals by late consumers
The model is updated to include the potential for early withdrawals by late consumers. is the withdrawal and storage quantity of digital currency 2 fv; sg, and the remainder of the early withdrawal is used to buy goods at t = 1:
Consumption for late consumer i 2 I from goods bought at t = 1 and at t = 2 is updated as
where the boxes indicate added terms. For late consumer i 2 I; the amount of digital currency stored from t = 1 to t = 2 includes M
Withdrawal strategy The withdrawal strategy for late consumer i 2 I is
The joint set of withdrawal strategies for all late consumers i 2 I is de…ned as the withdrawal set f i g i2I :
Banks The budget constraints for banks at t = 1; 2 are updated with new expressions in boxes to re ‡ect early withdrawals by late consumers as:
De…nition 2 A Nash equilibrium at date of the late consumers'strategic withdrawal game is de…ned as the withdrawal set
which is the set of withdrawal strategies i for each late consumer i 2 I, and where i for each i 2 I is a best response given f i 0 g i 0 2I , the withdrawal strategies of all other late consumers i 0 2 I.
In order to distinguish the threat that digital currency poses in the form of runs, it is important to …rst provide the contrasting result of …nancial stability that arises in the economy due to nominal prices and bank deposits.
Financial stability Consider a withdrawal set in which there are no early withdrawals by late consumers: w i = M C wi 1 = 0 for 2 fv; sg and all i 2 I: The elastic value of …at reserves, as well as public and private digital currency, enables elastic nominal prices in the economy, which supports a …nancial system that can create optimal asset and liquidity risk sharing and enhances …nancial stability of the banking system. The elasticity of the price level at t = 1 and t = 2 re ‡ects the elastic value of a digital currency, as with …at reserves, since the real value of the digital currency at each period is the inverse of the price level. This elastic value of the digital currency that can provide the optimal allocation of consumption also enhances …nancial stability against two primary risks inherent in the banking system. One risk is solvency-based bank runs from the potential insolvency of the banking system in the case of low real returns on assets, r 2 . The second risk is liquidity-based bank runs from the potential illiquidity of the banking system in the case of a large fraction of early consumers, :
First, consider the risk of insolvency in the case of low realizations of r 2 : P 2 increases due to the reduction in goods available to sell at t = 2: This leads …rms to hold over goods from t = 1 to sell at t = 2; such that late consumers do not receive any greater consumption by running the bank to buy goods at t = 1: Moreover, banks are e¤ectively hedged on their nominal deposit liabilities at t = 2: The equilibrium price level at t = 2 remains elevated even with the counterbalancing e¤ect of …rms selling more goods at t = 2: The elevated price level implies that the real cost of banks't = 2 deposit liabilities falls enough that banks do not default.
Second, consider the risk of the bank defaulting when there is a large realization of early consumers, : P 1 increases from the larger amounts of money spent for goods at t = 1: This leads …rms to liquidate a greater amount of assets to sell additional goods at t = 1: While additional goods sold provides a partial counterbalancing e¤ect on the price level, P 1 is still su¢ ciently elevated such that …rms do not default on their loans to banks, and banks do not default on paying withdrawals. Banks continue to rollover loans to …rms, which enables …rms to only liquidate assets to the extent that it is pro…t-maximizing according to selling goods at t = 1 relative to at t = 2. A marginal late consumer would not prefer to withdraw to buy goods at t = 1 because of the higher nominal deposit return as well as relatively lower price level P 2 at t = 2:
Proposition 7 For all realizations of ( ; r 2 ) at each date ; there exists a Nash equilibrium without bank runs:
for all 2 fv; sg and all i 2 I:
Digital currency runs
I now turn to the threats at date 0 banks face of withdrawal runs, with w i = 1 for all i 2 I; that may take two di¤erent forms. The …rst threat comes from late consumers running the bank to secure real consumption at t = 1. In this case, late consumers do not withdraw any digital currency to store at t = 1 for buying goods at t = 2: M 
0:
For w i = 1; the price level at periods 1 and 2 depending on M C wi 1 are given in the following table:
Under the …rst threat, with w i = 1 and M C wi 1 = 0; all late consumers run on the banking system in order to buy goods at t = 1: Similar to above, the impact would be an increase in P 1 ; which would lead …rms to liquidate a greater amount of assets than otherwise in order to sell additional goods at t = 1: While additional goods sold would provide a partial counterbalancing e¤ect on the price level, P 1 would still be su¢ ciently elevated such that …rms would not default on their loans to banks, and banks would not default on paying withdrawals. Banks could continue to rollover loans to …rms, which enables …rms to only liquidate assets to the extent that it is pro…t-maximizing for selling goods at t = 1 relative to at t = 2. A marginal late consumer would prefer to deviate from the strategy of withdrawing to buy goods at t = 1 in order to withdraw instead at t = 2 for the higher nominal deposit return as well as relatively lower price level P 2 : Thus, a marginal late consumer who deviates and withdraws instead at t = 2 has greater consumption. Hence, with M C wi 1 = 0; all late consumers would prefer to withdraw at t = 2; and such liquidity-based runs do not occur in equilibrium The outcome of no bank runs,
is a Nash equilibrium, and there are no defaults: 
which can be simpli…ed as This is because with a greater amount of late consumers, there is a larger amount of digital currency withdrawals under a withdrawal run threat at t = 1 that has greater ability to deplete the bank, cause a bank default, and enable the withdrawal run threat to sustain as an equilibrium run. ; there exists a digital currency run Nash equilibrium in the form of digital currency withdrawals by late consumers that create a complete liquidation of the banking system in absence of a lender of last resort.
Central bank as lender of last resort
The central bank has the ability and discretion to create an additional quantity of the supply of …at money, which gives the central bank a natural monopoly over the outside supply of liquidity available to banks. Because of this, the central bank has the unique ability to act as lender of last resort to banks with public digital currency deposits by issuing an additional quantity of public digital currency that is lent to banks facing runs at t = 1.
Regardless of the seniority of the central bank's loans to banks, the central bank can create and lend large enough amounts to such illiquid banks to ensure they do not default at t = 1 and t = 2: Hence, the the central bank does not face any risk of banks defaulting on the loans. Borrowing banks can repay the loans, comprised of outside digital currency at t = 1; in kind at t = 2 with public digital currency received from their returns on loans to …rms:
The withdrawal run threat on a bank is that all late consumers i 2 I withdraw and store digital currency at t = 1: w i 2 (0; 1] and M In equilibrium, banks do not borrow from the central bank. The potential case of a digital currency run is an out-of-equilibrium threat that is prevented from occurring as an equilibrium because of the ability and willingness of the central bank to elastically supply its digital currency as lender of last resort.
Lemma 3 For all realizations of ( ; r 2 ), the Nash equilibrium without digital currency runs for banks with …at and public digital currency deposits is unique.
Public versus private digital currency The central bank cannot lend private digital currency to banks with private digital currency deposits that face digital currency run threats. Hence, banks cannot fend o¤ such threats, and the digital currency run is an equilibrium. The central bank is not able to act as lender of last resort because it cannot create the private digital currency required to lend. While a private digital currency does not cause a digital currency run equilibrium to occur, the private digital currency enables it to happen.
Proposition 9 For banks with public digital currency deposits facing a digital currency run threat, the central bank acts as lender of last resort by providing an elastic outside money supply. The digital currency run equilibrium does not exist, and the Nash equilibrium without bank runs is unique. Whereas, for banks with private digital currency deposits, the central bank cannot act as lender of last resort, and the digital currency run equilibrium exists at dates with < 1 1+m 0;
:
The proposition re ‡ects the contrast of the elastic supply of public digital currency but inelastic supply of private digital currency. For a public digital currency, the central bank can elastically supply its own digital currency to banks. For a private digital currency, the central cannot create the private digital currency required for lender of last resort.
This result also highlights a distinction between an elastic value yet inelastic supply of a private digital currency. Even with an inelastic supply of the digital currency, prices are elastic and permits the optimal equilibrium, even with the realization of low asset returns and high early consumer liquidity needs. However, an inelastic supply of the digital currency also permits the digital currency run equilibrium, which elastic prices do not prevent. Hence, there is a trade-o¤ for private digital currency deposits, which avoid the costs of distortionary central bank …at in ‡ation but are subject to digital currency runs.
Concluding remarks
A major theme in the academic literature since the …nancial crisis is investigating causes of fragility in the leveraged …nancial system. Now, with the heightened interest and concern about the potential impact on the …nancial system that may come from …ntech, understanding the …nancial fragility that major …nancial technologies may bring is crucial.
This paper provides a …rst examination within the burgeoning literature on …ntech of the potential impact of digital currency on the stability of the banking system. Digital currency permits but does not necessarily lead to the ex-ante disintermediation of the banking system. Consumers may deposit digital currency at banks because of the bene…t of liquidity risk sharing that banks provide. Banks are resilient from aggregate return and liquidity risk with an elastic price level under a digital currency as with …at money. The disintermediation threat of digital currency takes the form of digital currency runs that create fragility of the banking system ex interim: This paper shows that there is an important trade-o¤ between the features of privately issued digital currency, such as bitcoin, and publicly issued central bank digital currency, which is a growing consideration by central banks worldwide. Central bank discretion can lead to distortionary in ‡ation that impacts public digital currency as with …at money but enables the central bank to act as lender of last resort. Private digital currency precludes the central bank from in ‡ation but also from acting as a lender of last resort. The central bank can elastically supply its own digital currency, as with …at money, to lend to banks with public digital currency deposits. This prevents digital currency runs from occurring and provides a unique equilibrium with the optimal allocation of liquidity and consumption. However, the inelastic supply of private digital currency allows for a banking crisis equilibrium with digital currency runs that deplete banks with private digital currency deposits.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof for Proposition 1. The planner's optimization (7) gives binding budget constraints and …rst order conditions for EU with respect to a 0 ; which gives equation (8); g 1 ; which gives the …rst equation of (14); and a 1 ; which gives the third equation of (14): Binding budget constraints imply equations (9)-(11).
The optimal storage, liquidation, and consumption allocation depends on the joint realization of ( ; r 2 ): De…ne consumption if there were no storage or liquidation for any realization of ( ; r 2 ), g 1 ( ; r 2 ) = a 1 ( ; r 2 ) = 0; as c 1 g 0 ; c 2
; there is positive storage g 1 = (1 )g 0 a 0 r 2 > 0 to equalize marginal utilities between early and late consumers such that u 0 (c 1 ) = u 0 (c 2 ): As a result,
This outcome occurs for a low enough joint realization of ( ; r 2 );
which can be expressed as r 2 < r 2 ( )
and < (r 2 ) g 0 g 0 +a 0 r 2 that implies a threshold ( ; r 2 ): When the illiquid asset return or the aggregate liquidity need for early consumers is small enough, positive storage of goods from t = 1 to t = 2 enables late consumers to share equally with early consumers in the total goods available at t = 1 and t = 2: The marginal rate of substitution between late and early consumers equals the marginal rate of transformation of one on storage between t = 2 and t = 1:
; which holds with an implicit (^ ;r 2 ) for r 2 >r 2 ( ) and >^ (r 2 ); such a high enough joint realization of ( ; r 2 ) implies there is instead positive liquidation a 1 > 0 implicitly de…ned by u 0 (c 1 ) = r 2 r 1 u 0 (c 2 ): When the illiquid asset return or the aggregate liquidity for early consumers is large enough, asset liquidations allows for early consumers to share in part of the abundance of goods that are available at t = 2: The marginal rate of substitution between late and early consumers equals the marginal rate of transformation between assets'return at t = 2
and liquidation return at t = 1:
; for moderate realizations of ( ; r 2 ); there is no storage or liquidation,
These results for optimal consumption, storage, and liquidation are summarized as
Proof for Proposition 2. Market clearing for goods at t 2 f0; 1; 2g requires that all constraints bind for the optimizations of the consumer, bank, and …rm given by optimization equations (3)- (5), with the exception of the …rm's constraint a 1 a 0 . Necessary …rst order conditions and su¢ cient second order conditions hold for the consumer, bank, and …rm optimization. Thus, the market equilibrium exists and is unique up to an indeterminate price level at t = 0; P s 0;0 ; with equilibrium prices P s t ( ; r 2 ) at t 2 f1; 2g given by equations (12) and (13), and where …rst order conditions for the bank's optimization determine optimal deposit rates as R equal to the market equilibrium rate R : The …rm's …rst order conditions with respect to fg t ; a t g t2f1;2g determine a t ( ; r 2 ) = a t ( ; r 2 ) and g t ( ; r 2 ) = g t ( ; r 2 ) for t 2 f0; 1g; where for < (r 2 ); r (12) and (13), consumption for early and late consumers can be solved as Proof for Lemma 1. With public digital currency, equilibrium prices at t 2 f1; 2g are 
with R Proof for Proposition 6. From proposition 3, for CB < 1; the expected utility of …at money deposits and public digital currency is less than that of the optimal consumption allocation fc t g t2f1;2g ; From the proof of proposition 5, regardless of CB ; the expected utility of private digital currency deposits is equal to that of the optimal consumption allocation fc t g t2f1;2g : Hence, consumers do not hold …at money deposits or public digital currency, D ; the bank's budget constraint at t = 1 implies that the bank defaults at t = 1; D 1 < 1; does not roll over any lending to …rms, L F 1 = 0; and hence has no revenues for withdrawals at t = 2; for a complete default at t = 2;
Suppose there is any deviation in the withdrawal strategy i 00 by any late consumer i 00 : For w i 00 < 1; :the late consumer receives no amount for the withdrawal of (1 w i 00 )
at t = 2. For an early withdrawal demand not in digital currency, consumption c i 00
is unchanged. Hence, is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof for Lemma 3. Consider any withdrawal strategy set with positive early withdrawals for any set I 0 2 I of late consumers. The bank can borrow from the central bank the amount of the public digital currency withdrawals at t = 1:
: There is no default for the bank; which implies that the withdrawal strategy with a positive amount of early withdrawals for each late consumer i 0 2 I 0 is not a best response. Hence, the Nash equilibrium without early withdrawals is unique.
Proof for Proposition 9. Following from the proof of lemma 3, for banks with public digital currency deposits, there is a unique Nash equilibrium without early withdrawals by late consumers. For banks with private digital currency deposits, for 
